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Decentralisation continues to be well received as a strategy 
for improving the governance of countries and delivering 
more responsive and efficient services. Cheerleaders include 
multilateral agencies like the World Bank and developed 
countries, like England, which seek to reverse years of 
centralisation. Evaluating the effectiveness of decentralised 
models raises the question of what it means to be 
‘decentralised’, and how decentralisation itself is measured. 
This article describes the World Bank’s diagnostic framework 
for assessing decentralisation and applies the framework to 
the New Zealand local government system. 
Mike Reid is the Principal Policy Adviser at Local Government New Zealand.
sign of decreasing. By 2010 almost 95% 
of the world’s democracies had some 
form of elected sub-national government, 
with the devolution of political, fiscal and 
administrative powers being widespread. 
Bringing government closer to 
the people so as to promote greater 
participation and active citizenship is an 
objective that is difficult to oppose. Not 
only does it remind us of the origins 
of democracy and its virtues, it also 
reinforces stereotypical conceptions of 
‘big’ government, namely unresponsive 
bureaucracies, wasteful spending and 
poorly targeted public services. Yet not 
all decentralised governance systems 
deliver expected improvements in social 
and economic outcomes for citizens. It 
is an issue that has led the World Bank 
to look at what needs to be in place for 
the benefits of decentralisation to be 
realised. What, for example, distinguishes 
a decentralised governance system from 
a system in which local and regional 
authorities simply deliver responsibilities 
delegated by higher-order governments?
Alongside globalisation, localisation (the 
demand for local autonomy) has been 
one of the main forces shaping the world 
since the turn of the current century 
(Boschmann, 2009; Gemmel, Kneller and 
Sanz, 2009). It is a trend that shows no 
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To answer such questions, the World 
Bank has developed what it describes as a 
diagnostic framework, designed to assess 
the potential of a local government system 
to exercise effective decentralisation. It 
examines systems of local government 
through the lens of discretion and 
downward accountability. This article 
applies the World Bank framework to 
the New Zealand local government 
system to assess its suitability for effective 
decentralised governance should a time 
come when such an objective is desirable 
to national authorities.
Defining decentralisation
Decentralisation tends to be promoted on 
the basis that it leads to better social and 
economic outcomes for communities (see 
UCLG, 2008 and Blöchliger and Égert, 
2013). This is partly explained by the 
concept of information asymmetry: that 
local governments have a more informed 
knowledge of local conditions than higher-
level governments and are therefore better 
placed to provide public services that 
match the preferences of their citizens. 
Because of this proximity they are more 
open to scrutiny by local citizens, which 
should result in more effective, efficient 
services than if these were provided by 
higher-level governments, as well as 
greater innovation.1 In contrast, critics of 
decentralisation argue that competition 
between councils can lead to a ‘race to the 
bottom’: for example, councils cutting taxes 
to attract investment to the point where 
local infrastructure is not maintained and 
a post-code lottery results.2 
Definitions of decentralisation vary, 
with many coalescing around the concept 
of fiscal autonomy and the level of fiscal 
discretion able to be exercised by sub-
national governments (Gemmell, Kneller 
and Sanz, 2009). A broader perspective 
is provided by United Cities and Local 
Governments (UCLG) in its major 
comparative study of decentralisation:
Decentralization is … characterized 
by the existence of locally elected 
authorities, distinct from the 
state’s administrative authorities, 
and exercising, in the framework 
of the law, their own powers and 
responsibilities for which they have 
a degree of self-government … . 
(UCLG, 2008, p.314)
The UCLG definition stresses the 
democratic nature of decentralised 
governance arrangements, separation 
from the state apparatus, and the existence 
of guaranteed powers, functions or 
roles. It is underpinned by three distinct 
elements: 
Political decentralisation: the range 
of functions or authority, transferred 
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Political 
Decentralisation
Local Governance Outcomes
Administrative Decentralisation
Community-Driven Development / Social Accountability Approaches
Political accountability
• Local council oversight
• Electoral accountability measures 
(recall, write-ins, campaign financing,
independent candidates)
• Participatory planning
• Demand side
• Participatory budgeting
• Participatory expenditure tracking
• Citizen access to information campaigns
• Participatory monitoring and evaluation
• Participatory management of 
investments/projects
• Citizen feedback for services (report 
cards, social audits)
• Regulatory discretion
• Procurement discretion
• Employment / civil service discretion
Administrative accountability
• Bureaucratic hierarchy
• Civil service rules
• Procurement practices
Financial accountability
• Local public funds management 
(planning, budgeting, reporting, internal 
control / audit, external audit)
• Responsive, effective, efficient, sustainable services
• Enhanced political, financial and administrative accountability
• Greater local control over economic development planning & decision-making
• Strengthened accountability through greater citizen monitoring and vigilance 
over power holders
• Separation of 
powers: Local 
administration, 
parliament, courts
• Elections
• Party systems / party 
structures
Fiscal 
Decentralisation
• Discretion over 
expenditures
• Revenue autonomy
• Predictable & rule 
based government 
transfers
• Discretion over 
borrowing 
Figure 1: Framework for local government discretion and accountability
Source: Yilmaz, Beris and Serrano-Berthet, 2008, p.3
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from higher to local levels of 
government, which are governed 
by locally accountable political 
representatives: for example, well-
defined decision-making powers and 
systems of accountability.
Administrative decentralisation: 
the way in which programmes are 
actually administered ‘on the ground’ 
and may involve measures such as 
shifting staff from their respective 
national ministries and bringing 
them under the control of a local 
authority, along with necessary 
administrative support and human 
resources functions. 
Fiscal decentralisation: the ability of 
local governments to levy local taxes, 
determine the rate of tax and exercise 
discretion over the allocation of 
their financial resources – essentially 
the guarantee of fiscal discretion 
(Boschmann, 2009; Bailey, 1999; 
UCLG, 2008). Fiscal decentralisation 
can be measured from the 
perspective of spending, revenue, the 
proportion of sub-central revenue in 
general government tax revenue, or 
the share of sub-central tax revenue 
in general government tax revenue.
The assessment model is designed 
for assessing the degree to which the 
three elements are present within a 
specific local government system, as 
all three are essential if the capacity 
for decentralised governance is to be 
optimised. A correlation is required 
between the assignment of responsibilities 
(political decentralisation), the 
provision of sufficient resources (fiscal 
decentralisation) and the administrative 
discretion to deliver those responsibilities 
(Bailey, 1999). 
The diagnostic framework
One of the challenges facing the World 
Bank and other agencies promoting 
decentralisation is to understand why 
some forms of decentralisation are 
more successful than others. Are policy 
makers, for example, too focused on 
fiscal decentralisation without giving 
enough attention to the administrative 
and political dimensions? Yilmaz, Beris 
and Serrano-Berthet (2008) argue that 
the failure of some states to achieve the 
promoted advantages of decentralisation 
is often a result of failing to find the 
balance between the supply and demand 
sides of the accountability equation, with 
the result that accountability to citizens is 
undermined (see Figure 1).
The diagnostic framework has 
been designed to identify areas of 
misalignment, where, for example, 
levels of discretion and accountability 
are insufficient to allow a sub-national 
government to adequately implement 
the policy and operational matters 
assigned to it (Yilmaz, Beris and Serrano-
Berthet, 2008). Central to the framework 
are the three dimensions, political, 
administrative and fiscal, creating what 
the authors describe as ‘discretionary 
space’. Discretionary space refers to the 
scale of public decision-making available 
to a local government system which is 
free from direct intervention from senior 
governments. Effective use of this space is 
often dependent upon an accountability 
system that is downward-focused in 
both the public and social spheres. The 
framework describes these two spheres 
of accountability as public accountability 
and social accountability. 
Public accountability (the supply side) 
represents the rules which have been set 
by higher-level governments to provide a 
safeguard against the misuse of a council’s 
discretion. Yet by itself the effectiveness 
of public accountability is limited, and it 
needs to be backed up, and complemented, 
by social accountability or community-
driven development (the demand side). 
Social accountability refers to the degree 
of direct engagement citizens have with 
their councils, such as the right to make 
submissions and speak directly to council 
or committee meetings. Where public 
accountability refers to formal rules, 
social accountability operates at the more 
informal level, governing the interaction 
of institutions with citizens. To be 
effective, public and social accountability 
must be downward-focused, with both 
acting to strengthen the ability of citizens 
to hold their local governments to 
account, as well as ensuring that councils 
have the means and incentives to respond 
to citizen demands. Complementarity, 
once achieved, should be reflected in 
more responsive, effective and efficient 
local governments.3 In addition, local 
services should be more sustainable, more 
accountable, and provide for more local 
control over decision-making (ibid.). 
Table 1: Local political settings
Measures
Institutional separation of 
powers at the local level
New Zealand uses the council-manager form of local 
government, with a contract-based relationship between 
governing bodies and chief executives. Councillors manage 
management through an annual performance-based contract; 
however, governance competence varies and the degree of 
separation can vary according to the size of a local authority. 
Recent legislative changes, such as allowing councils to set 
the number and overall remuneration of staff, may further 
undermine the separation.
Existence and quality of 
local electoral systems
Local elections are governed by clear statutory provisions 
which limit the risk of political influence, such as redistricting. 
The government has recently amended legislation governing 
the transparency of electoral donations. Campaign expenditure 
limits are in place.
Nature of party systems 
and structures
Due to the dominance of local political alliances, national 
political parties are often less visible at the local level. While 
individuals can be elected on party tickets, the rules governing 
predetermination effectively rule out the ability to caucus, 
diminishing their effectiveness. Consequently, councillors are 
primarily accountable to communities rather than to national 
political organisations, with stronger downward accountability.
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The diagnostic framework examines 
each form of decentralisation, political, 
administrative and fiscal, from three 
perspectives. These are the level of political 
discretion held by local politicians (local 
settings); the nature of the accountability 
framework; and the degree to which 
accountability is downward-facing. 
Political decentralisation
Within the diagnostic framework, political 
decentralisation, the degree of local 
political discretion and accountability, 
is measured by the capacity of local 
elected leaders to exercise independent 
action. Determining the level of political 
decentralisation involves the nature of 
existing political settings and whether 
or not the direction of accountability is 
downward. Three criteria are employed 
to assess a local government system’s local 
political settings: the separation of powers; 
the nature of the electoral system; and the 
existence of a functioning party system.
In New Zealand the separation 
of powers can be traced back to the 
influence of New Public Management 
during the reforms in 1988–89, which 
limited governing bodies to the direct 
employment of a chief executive only 
who employed the remainder of the 
staff on their behalf. The new governing 
approach required elected members 
to operate at the strategic level, setting 
outcomes and policies for management 
to achieve while at the same time 
remaining distant from operations and 
the implementation of those policies. 
Influence was to be exercised through 
the chief executive’s annual performance 
contract. The second criterion, ideal 
electoral systems, are those that enable 
the participation of marginalised groups, 
provide local politicians with sufficient 
power to influence local outcomes, and 
are free from manipulation by higher-
level governments. The third criterion 
addresses the role of national political 
parties at the local level. On this issue, 
Yilmaz et al. refer to research suggesting 
that the inclusion of parties at the 
local level can result in policy-making 
being ‘contaminated by patronage and 
clientelism instead of focusing on local 
benefits’ (Packel quoted in Yilmaz, Beris 
and Serrano-Berthet, 2008, p.9); the 
framework explicitly values a local politics 
that is downward-focused (see Table 1).
The second test in each of the three 
dimensions examines the degree to 
which the accountability framework is 
downward-focused in terms of both 
public and social accountability. These 
are examined in Table 2.
In terms of political decentralisation, 
the New Zealand system scores well for 
its political settings. There is a degree of 
separation of powers between governance 
and administration, albeit variable 
according to size of council; electoral 
systems are set in legislation and free of 
the kind of patronage by higher-level 
governments that occurs elsewhere, such 
as the ability of governments to adjust 
the date of council elections so that the 
outcomes are likely to be favourable for a 
political grouping; and electoral processes 
tend to be locally oriented, without a 
dominant party presence. Shortcomings, 
however, were identified. These are:
•	 the	lack	of	any	mechanism	for	
recalling elected members (usually 
through a petition which, if 
successful, triggers an election);
•	 the	lack	of	incentives	to	encourage	
councils to make greater use of 
Table 2: Local political accountability 
Public accountability
Ensuring representation of 
disadvantaged groups through quotas 
and reserve seats
Not practiced in New Zealand local government, 
although a few councils have established separate 
Mäori seats.
Allowing independent candidates to 
run for office
There are no constraints on the ability of 
independents to run for office.
Introducing term limits Not practiced in New Zealand.
Allowing for the recall of elected 
officials from public office
Not practiced in New Zealand.
Ensuring local elected officials have 
oversight responsibilities
The Local Government Act 2002 sets the 
framework by which elected members scrutinise 
and hold management to account.
Limiting council employees and 
government appointees as elected 
members
Council employees can stand for election for the 
council that is their employer but must resign 
from their positions if elected.
Social accountability
Ensuring the right of citizens to 
demand public hearings and public 
petitions
The local government legislative framework 
includes a range of mechanisms for ensuring 
citizens’ voices are heard in planning and 
decision-making. Polls are optional and not 
binding except for certain electoral-related polls.
Establishing specific bodies 
empowering citizens to demand 
accountability
There are no equivalent provisions in the New 
Zealand system, although councils are subject to 
the law and citizens can seek judicial review of 
council decisions.
Using multi-stakeholder forums, citizen 
juries and forums to increase citizen 
influence by specific groups
Councils have the ability to make use of forums 
and citizens’ juries to provide groups and sectors, 
such as youth, with an opportunity to express 
their views.
Introducing participatory budgeting Participatory budgeting is not practiced, although 
councils are required to undertake formal 
consultation when adopting budgets and many 
use complementary mechanisms to involve under-
represented groups. 
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third-party organisations to oversee 
performance and/or provide policy 
input, such as citizens’ juries; and
•	 the	absence	of	any	form	of	
participatory budgeting to enable 
citizens to set local authority budgets 
and priorities.
The model also highlighted two other 
shortcomings: the lack of quota seats for 
minority and/or disadvantaged groups, 
and the absence of term limits. Although 
neither of these features is present in New 
Zealand local government, other options 
are available, to address the shortcomings. 
For example, councils have the ability to 
appoint citizens, such as minority group 
representatives, to council committees; 
establish advisory groups; and adopt a 
proportional voting system (STV: single 
transferable vote). Proportional systems 
are regarded as more representative 
than the more commonly used first-
past-the-post electoral system. There is 
also a process for creating Mäori wards, 
although not a process that councils, or 
Mäori, can implement easily. While the 
model promotes term limits as a way of 
strengthening downward accountability, 
there is considerable debate about the 
value of term limits, and as an approach 
to avoid elite capture it is primarily 
relevant to emerging rather than mature 
democracies.4 
Despite a history of strong political 
discretion and the downward trend in 
both political and social accountability, 
recent legislative changes represent a risk 
to local political discretion. Amendments 
to the Local Government Act 2002 in 
December 2012 gave the minister of 
local government an extensive suite of 
intervention powers, such as the power to 
appoint commissioners or call an election 
where he or she believes there has been 
a substantial governance failure, or a 
council is unable or unwilling to perform 
its functions and duties. Arguably, 
the additional intervention powers 
have weakened downward political 
accountability and undermined at least 
part of the local government sector’s 
ability to exercise effective decentralised 
governance, should that ever become 
an option. Other changes, such as the 
introduction of a list of core services that 
must be considered and a more restricted 
purpose for local government, also work 
to diminish elected members’ discretion. 
Added to local government’s lack of any 
constitutional status, the overall effect of 
these changes is to further undermine 
downward accountability.
Similarly, changes to the reorganisation 
provisions which appear to be weighted 
in favour of the creation of much 
larger local authorities risk diminishing 
citizens’ influence. Larger councils tend 
to be less responsive to citizens’ wishes, 
increase the distance between citizens 
and their political representatives, and 
reduce the effectiveness of both voice 
and exit (moving out of a local authority 
area) (Slack and Cote, 2014). It is also 
increasingly common for other legislation 
to include provisions that allow ministers 
to overrule specific council decisions: for 
example, decisions about the number and 
location of aquaculture farms. The overall 
picture is one of a system with strong 
historic levels of political accountability 
which are gradually diminishing.
Administrative decentralisation
If decentralisation is to work local 
governments need sufficient administrative 
autonomy to enforce regulatory decisions, 
govern their own procurement 
arrangements (within the context of 
national standards) and control and 
manage their workforces. In addition, 
councils need the authority to issue 
generally enforceable regulations on 
public issues within their jurisdictions 
(also subject to higher-level government 
laws) which reflect local concerns and 
address local threats to health and well-
being. This requires an ability to make 
decisions about fundamental aspects of 
their internal administration and 
performance. The diagnostic framework 
identifies critical settings, which are 
described in Table 3.
Administrative decentralisation 
is critical if decentralised governance 
arrangements are to deliver expected 
efficiency and responsiveness. Without 
it there are risks that officials will fail 
to implement their councils’ policies 
responsively, and, as Yilmaz, Beris and 
Serrano-Berthet suggest, the result 
can be a ‘situation where field officers 
maintain strong links with their original 
line ministries, thereby enjoying some 
insulation against local control’ (Yilmaz, 
Beris and Serrano-Berthet, p.17). 
Strengthening downward accountability 
Table 3: Administrative settings
Measures
Autonomy to recruit staff New Zealand councils have full autonomy.
Ability to control staff numbers, 
including the authority to remove 
surplus staff
New Zealand councils have full control over 
numbers of staff and tenure.
Autonomy to set pay levels for staff 
and pay staff from their own budgets
New Zealand councils have full autonomy to set 
pay levels (which reflect market realities) and are 
required to fund salaries from their own budgets.
Discretion to procure and administer 
services
Councils have the flexibility to develop 
procurement strategies and set levels of service, 
although in some policy arenas national standards 
may exist.
Authority to control career 
management, such as to shift staff 
to de-concentrated units within the 
organisation
New Zealand councils, through their chief 
executives, have full discretion, within national 
employment law, to manage the allocation of staff 
and career development. 
Control over their own performance 
management
Internal performance management of staff is 
under the control of councils and their chief 
executives. Some council activities are required 
to meet standards or benchmarks set by central 
government.
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is one way of addressing the principal 
agent problem (see Table 4).
The New Zealand system of local 
government scores well against the criteria 
for administrative decentralisation. 
Councils have a clearly defined range of 
by-law-making powers and a conditional 
ability for enforcing by-laws. They are 
in charge of their own procurement 
policies and practices and an increasing 
number are now posting information 
about successful tenders online. In most 
cases councils can determine their own 
levels of service, although the increasing 
use of national standards is gradually 
diminishing discretion in some areas, 
especially in regulatory functions. Councils 
also have full control of employment 
and remuneration. In terms of public 
and social accountability, councils are 
subject to scrutiny by the Office of the 
Auditor-General, which reports annually 
to Parliament with the results of its audit 
of council annual reports, and the Local 
Government Official Information Act 
ensures citizens have access to public 
information. Most councils also undertake 
resident satisfaction surveys, with the 
resulting information also utilised in 
their performance management systems. 
Fiscal decentralisation
Without the appropriate fiscal instruments 
and the discretion to use them, 
decentralisation is ‘doomed’ (Yilmaz, 
Beris and Serrano-Berthet, 2008). Fiscal 
decentralisation represents the degree 
to which local governments have the 
fiscal capacity to fulfil their allocated 
responsibilities and whether the scope 
of their decision-making responsibilities 
corresponds to the breadth of their duties 
and responsibilities. The diagnostic 
framework employs four criteria to 
assess the local fiscal settings of a system: 
expenditure assignment roles; revenue 
assignment; intergovernmental transfers 
(fiscal gap); and infrastructure funding.
Expenditure assignment. 
Decentralisation requires that higher-
level governments assign a substantial 
range of expenditure responsibilities 
to local governments, along with 
sufficient autonomy for them to 
respond to local circumstances. In 
Table 4: Local administrative accountability 
Public accountability
Accountability structures within the 
bureaucratic hierarchy
Councils are required to establish annual 
performance agreements with their chief 
executives. 
Independent bodies able to conduct 
administrative audits
New Zealand councils are subject to supervision 
by both the Office of the Ombudsman and the 
Office of the Auditor-General.
Administrative courts able to review 
councils’ regulatory and administrative 
decisions
New Zealand councils are subject to judicial 
review.
Social accountability
Openness of information to allow 
citizen monitoring
The Local Government Official Information Act 
operates on the assumption that all information 
is public except for in a narrow range of 
circumstances, e.g. commercial sensitivity. 
Satisfaction surveys provide decision-makers 
with information about local perceptions of their 
services.
Monitoring procurement and 
implementation of contracts
It is increasingly common for councils to provide 
details of tenders and successful bidders on their 
websites. 
Monitoring local service provision Councils set performance targets annually and 
report on performance in their annual reports. 
Table 5: Fiscal settings
Measures
Expenditure assignment should 
enable councils to set and allocate 
budgets sufficient to meet their 
responsibilities.
New Zealand councils have the discretion to set 
budgets and determine spending levels to meet 
statutory roles and community expectations, 
within a financially prudent framework; however, 
reliance on a single taxing power, rates, can act as 
a constraint on the ability to raise sufficient revenue 
to meet community needs.
Revenue assignment should be 
sufficient to meet local government’s 
roles and responsibilities
Councils have a single taxing power covering 
land and property. They have discretion to set tax 
rates, define the tax base (property-related) and 
administer the collection of taxes. Since 1958 
there have been at least seven funding reviews that 
have recommended that councils should be given 
additional revenue sources.
Financing the fiscal gap Fiscal transfers are not used; however, there is a 
hypothecated fund for roading and public transport 
which pays for both national and local roads.6 The 
rates rebate scheme, which assists low-income 
home owners to pay rates, is a form of supply-side 
transfer mechanism. A strong case exists for some 
form of equalisation scheme.
Options for financing infrastructure Councils have wide discretion for financing 
infrastructure, including public–private 
partnerships; however, road tolling can only be used 
with the agreement of the government.7
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addition, a well-defined institutional 
framework with clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities for each sphere 
of government is required. This helps 
clarify accountability and reduces 
the risk of local agencies of higher-
level governments attempting to 
constrain councils’ autonomy and 
responsiveness.
Revenue assignment. Local 
government accountability is 
enhanced when the services they 
provide are funded from their 
own tax base (Oates, 1972; Bailey, 
1999). Consequently, councils 
need access to at least one tax base, 
along with the ability to set the tax 
rate and administer the revenue 
collection. Any efforts by higher-level 
governments to constrain revenue-
raising ability are likely to result in 
inefficient investment decisions.
The fiscal gap. Because fiscal transfers 
from higher-level to lower-level 
governments have implications for 
fiscal autonomy, consideration must 
be given to the design of any transfer 
instruments. Transfers can often leave 
little room for local decision-making 
and priority-setting, and can result 
in perverse incentives. For example, 
councils receiving transfers might 
be tempted to blame any under-
performance on the funding agency, 
thus undermining accountability.
Financing infrastructure. Having 
the ability to make financing 
choices when planning to invest in 
infrastructure is an essential element 
of fiscal autonomy and downward 
accountability. On the other 
hand, financing choices can create 
macroeconomic risks: for example, 
the level of sub-national debt. There 
are four generally used methods for 
limiting local government borrowing, 
some with greater consequences 
for fiscal decentralisation than 
others. These are the use of market 
discipline, cooperative arrangements 
between local and central 
governments, rule-based controls, 
and administrative constraints. The 
two methods that are most consistent 
with downward accountability are 
market discipline and cooperative 
arrangements.
As a general principle a local 
government system should be provided 
with the necessary  taxing and 
funding powers to fulfil its functional 
responsibilities, with a correspondence 
between the two. Questions, however, can 
be asked as to whether this is the case 
in New Zealand, with local government 
responsible for 10.5% of all public 
expenditure but receiving only 8.3% of 
all public revenue, a ratio that suggests 
the presence of a vertical fiscal imbalance. 
Indeed, the allocation of responsibilities 
between the two spheres of government 
has been incremental, without rational 
or coherent doctrine for making specific 
allocation choices (Bush, 1980), an 
issue which Yilmaz, Bersi and Serrano-
Berthet (p. 21) note can become a source 
of tension which, if not resolved, can 
constrain local autonomy. 
In terms of revenue assignment, 
councils currently have wide discretion 
to define their various forms of property 
tax and administer revenue collection; 
however, concerns are frequently raised 
about whether property taxes are sufficient 
to fund local government and its services. 
If these concerns are not addressed, New 
Zealand’s level of fiscal decentralisation 
is likely to decline. Fiscal accountability 
also requires that public funds are 
managed transparently and prudently 
and that decision-making is accountable. 
Criteria for assessing whether or not local 
Table 6: Local fiscal accountability 
Public accountability
Strengthening capability for public 
budgeting and financial management 
in local government systems
A wide range of accredited courses and training 
opportunities exist for financial managers in local 
government and elected members. Most councils 
have audit and risk committees. 
Setting standards for the control of 
inter-governmental transfers
Payments from the hypothecated transport fund 
are allocated according to a transparent formula 
developed in consultation with local government. 
Publishing transfer figures Yes.
Making audit results public Yes.
Clear rules for borrowing Yes.
Rules for hard-based budget 
constraints
Councils are required by law to balance their 
budgets on an accrual basis. They must also adopt 
a revenue strategy which sets out planned increases 
in council taxes for the coming decade.
Social accountability
Making budgets and end-of-year 
financial statements publicly 
available
Councils are required to publish audited annual 
reports by the end of October each year. Audit 
results are reported to Parliament by the Office of 
the Auditor-General.
Participatory budgeting practices No.
Participatory budget-tracking 
processes
Budgetary reporting arrangements are up to each 
council. The normal practice is for councillors to 
be provided with a quarterly financial update. 
Councils must now report progress annually against 
a nationally determined set of six prudent financial 
benchmarks, such as debt servicing as a proportion 
of expenditure. Before each election councils must 
publish a ‘pre-election’ report summarising key 
financial performance data.
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government’s fiscal decision-making is 
downwardly accountable are applied in 
Table 6.
In terms of the diagnostic 
framework, fiscal accountability is 
generally strong. Councils have broad 
financial discretionary powers, including 
access to a range of funding options 
for infrastructure construction and 
maintenance, ranging from bank debt 
to bonds. Borrowing is regulated by 
market discipline and the requirement 
to develop, after consultation, a financial 
strategy which includes debt limits. In 
addition to having built up considerable 
expertise and experience in long-term 
financial planning and management, 
many councils are now credit-rated. 
Many have audit and risk committees, 
and financial information is publicly 
available. Councils publish draft annual 
plans and budgets which are subject 
to community consultation, as well as 
annual reports which are audited, with 
the results tabled in Parliament. Public 
and social accountability frameworks are 
both downward-focused.
Participatory budgeting, however, 
is not practiced, although councils 
undertake formal consultative procedures 
to seek community views on budget and 
operational priorities. In fact, recent 
changes have removed the requirement 
to consult annually on the setting of 
council budgets; consultation is only 
required where a council decides to 
make a material variation to its ten-year 
financial strategy. Many of the financial 
decision-making constraints under which 
councils operate, such as the adoption of 
a ten-year financial strategy, the balanced 
budget requirement and the funding of 
depreciation, would appear to make it 
difficult to introduce a pure participatory 
budgeting approach, as a significant 
proportion of council expenditure is 
literally ‘pre-allocated’.
Downward accountability is also 
diminished by recent legislative changes 
that have given the minister of local 
government extensive ministerial inter-
vention powers. Among the factors 
that can trigger the use of these powers 
is the failure of a council to achieve 
the government’s prudent financial 
benchmarks over time. While at one level 
this might be very reasonable grounds 
for intervention, the history of local 
government in New Zealand over the 
past century provides little justification, 
and, while the financial benchmarks 
themselves should strengthen downward 
accountability, there is uncertainty about 
the manner in which ministers will 
respond to the information, and that 
in itself affects the way in which local 
decision-makers feel able to exercise 
discretion.
Conclusion
As an option for arranging public affairs, 
decentralisation continues to be popular, 
with supporters arguing that it has the 
potential to improve the efficiency of the 
public sector, strengthen social cohesion 
and promote long-term economic 
development and growth (Oates, 1972; 
Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz, 2009). For a 
country to achieve these benefits, its local 
government system needs to be able to 
exercise political, administrative and fiscal 
discretion. Indeed, as Bailey emphasises, 
true local government will only exist ‘when 
democratically elected bodies have well 
defined discretionary powers to provide 
services to their citizens and finance them 
with the proceeds of one or more exclusive 
local taxes of which they can determine 
the base and/or rate of tax (Bailey, 
1999, p.224). This requires a legislative 
framework that provides local politicians 
not only with the responsibilities to 
achieve local outcomes, but also with the 
necessary decision-making discretion 
and policy levers. As the framework is 
designed to highlight, decentralisation 
is unlikely to achieve expected benefits 
if not accompanied by the right fiscal, 
administrative and political settings.
Since reform in 1988–89, local 
government has arguably been well placed 
to take on greater responsibilities and 
exercise decentralised governance. The 
councils that emerged from reorganisation 
and modernisation had greater strategic 
capacity than their predecessors, as 
well as a requirement to operate in 
a more consultative and accountable 
manner. Twenty-five years on, the sector 
still conforms relatively well with the 
criteria employed in the diagnostic 
framework; however, recent changes are 
undermining downward accountability 
by diminishing local discretion and 
increasing national oversight. In addition, 
the problem of local government’s lack 
of constitutional certainty remains to 
be addressed. For New Zealand local 
government to meet the levels of pubic 
and social accountability recommended 
by the diagnostic framework, a new 
constitutional arrangement for local 
government is required: one that gives 
greater certainty and predictability to its 
role, functions and powers, and protects 
against what often appear to be poorly 
considered changes to its core legislation. 
Without such moves there appears little 
likelihood of any change to New Zealand’s 
ranking as the most centralised state in 
the OECD.
1 The evidence in favour of decentralisation will be looked at in 
more detail in a subsequent article.
2 Post-code lottery refers to situations where a person’s access 
to public services depends on where they live and the 
capacity of their local government to provide services that 
might be taken for granted in more well-off communities.
3 A New Zealand example of complementarity might be 
the requirements to deliver a balanced budget (public 
accountability) and provide opportunities for citizens 
to engage in the process of setting priorities (social 
accountability). 
4 Furthermore, local authority elections tend to result in a 
turnover of elected members of between 35% and 40%, 
probably reducing the need to consider term limits. 
5 As long as council debt is not guaranteed by national 
governments (as is the case in New Zealand), banks will 
ensure councils’ credit worthiness when considering requests 
for credit.
6 Local government currently receives 47% of the National 
Land Transport Fund, with the remaining 53% used to fund 
state highways, road safety, etc. Councils own and operate 
87% of roads.
7 A large proportion of council debt is provided by the Local 
Government Funding Agency, a council-owned trading 
company which has the ability to raise international bonds 
and lend at less than market interest rates. 
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